41b.1
引密释纳
（续上）密释纳末句：拉比约西 所说唯一的例外是寡妇，因她须为亡夫守丧。
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「……因为她须为亡夫守丧。」
due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband.
← 转房卷总目·第四章 行脱鞋礼的
这不是译本，是辅读层。中文承载文本本身，并逐句标出哪些是塔木德自己的话、 哪些是 施泰因扎尔茨 补入的解释，以及哪些地方翻译必然有所流失。
谢法利亚 的 威廉·戴维森 版用 <b> 标出塔木德原文，其余为
施泰因扎尔茨 补入。下面的比例是逐句从这个标记算出来的，不是判断。
这一面每读 19 句，只有一句以塔木德自己的话为主。把这件事藏起来， 读者会以为自己读的是塔木德；标出来，他才知道自己站在哪里。
（续上）密释纳末句：拉比约西 所说唯一的例外是寡妇，因她须为亡夫守丧。
「……因为她须为亡夫守丧。」
due to the mourning period she must observe for her deceased husband.
革玛拉问密释纳首句：不可转房说得通，因她或已怀孕而三个月内显不出，若胎儿存活，她本不在转房之列，亡夫兄弟便犯了兄弟之妻的妥拉禁令；可是为何连脱鞋礼也不可行？
革玛拉质问密释纳的开头一句：她不可转房，这固然说得通，因为她或许已经怀孕，而头三个月里还显不出来；那胎儿或许会存活。
The Gemara questions the mishna’s opening clause: Granted, she should not enter into levirate marriage, as she might already be pregnant, which would still not be noticeable during the first three months, and perhaps the baby will be viable.
那样就显出她本来就不在转房诫命之下，所以 亡夫兄弟 若与她成了转房，便触犯了妥拉不许与兄弟之妻同房的禁令。
In that case it would emerge that she was never subject to the mitzva of levirate marriage, and therefore, if the yavam consummates a levirate marriage he will have encountered the Torah prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife.
然而她为什么不可行 脱鞋礼 呢？
However, why should she not perform ḥalitza?
革玛拉提议：这条密释纳说孕妇不可行脱鞋礼，岂不是对 拉比约哈难 的定论性驳斥？他曾说与孕妇行的脱鞋礼，若她后来流产，仍算有效。答：他早已被驳过一次了；那就改说：从这里也可驳他。
革玛拉提议：这条密释纳说孕妇不可行 脱鞋礼，莫非就是对 拉比约哈难 之说的定论性驳斥？他曾说：与孕妇行的 脱鞋礼，她后来若流产，算是有效的 脱鞋礼。
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this mishna, which states that a pregnant woman should not perform ḥalitza, is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that a ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman who later miscarries is considered a valid ḥalitza.
革玛拉问：从别的出处，岂不是早已对 拉比约哈难 之说作过一次定论性驳斥了吗？
The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already conclusively refute the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan one time previously from other sources?
革玛拉把提议改说：那么就说，从这条密释纳也可得出对 拉比约哈难 之说的定论性驳斥。
The Gemara rephrases the suggestion: Let us say that from this mishna as well there is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
革玛拉化解：密释纳不许孕妇行脱鞋礼另有缘故——胎儿若存活，那脱鞋礼全属多余，她仍可嫁祭司；但旁人会当她是受脱鞋礼之妇，到头来得为她公开宣告。
革玛拉化解这提议：不然，这里密释纳不许她行 脱鞋礼，或许缘故在此：胎儿或许会存活，那样她虽行了 脱鞋礼 的举动，那举动却全无意义，因为本来全不需要，她仍可嫁入祭司家。
The Gemara deflects this suggestion: No, it is possible that in the mishna here, this is the reason that she may not perform ḥalitza: Perhaps the offspring will be viable, in which case although she performed the act of ḥalitza, it is entirely meaningless since it was completely unnecessary, and she would remain permitted to marry into the priesthood.
然而这会生出麻烦：人们或许不知道她所行的 脱鞋礼 无效，会以为她是 受脱鞋礼之妇，不可嫁给祭司。
However, this could lead to a problem: People might not realize that the ḥalitza she performed was meaningless, and they would think she is a ḥalutza who is prohibited from marrying a priest.
所以显出：她既可能怀孕，你若仍准她行 脱鞋礼，到头来或许须为她作公开宣告，证明她所行的 脱鞋礼 无效，她其实仍可嫁入祭司家。
It would therefore emerge that if you permit her to perform ḥalitza even though it is possible that she is pregnant, it could be that you will ultimately require a public announcement to be made for her to attest to the fact that the ḥalitza she performed was meaningless and she is in fact still permitted to marry into the priesthood.
问：何不先行脱鞋礼，必要时再宣告？答：有人在场看了脱鞋礼却没听到宣告，会误判她不可嫁祭司；所以密释纳要她先等三个月。
革玛拉不解这有何难处：她虽可能怀孕，何不就让她行 脱鞋礼，必要时再为她作公开宣告呢？
The Gemara wonders why this poses a problem: But why not let her perform ḥalitza even though it is possible she is pregnant, and then, if it becomes necessary, require a public announcement to be made for her?
革玛拉解释为何要避免依赖公开宣告：或许有些人在 脱鞋礼 时在场，宣告时却不在场，这些人就会错判她不可嫁入祭司家。
The Gemara explains why one should avoid having to rely on a public announcement: Perhaps there will be some people who are present at the ḥalitza but were not present at the public announcement, and those people will incorrectly disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.
为免这种情形，密释纳判她须先等三个月，才行 脱鞋礼。
To avoid this situation, the mishna rules that she should wait three months before performing ḥalitza.
问：这理由对寡妇说得通，被休的妇人本已不可嫁祭司，何不立即行脱鞋礼？答：另一缘故——立即行礼，她就失去头三个月从亡夫遗产领取的供养，而这期间她又不能再嫁，生计无着。
革玛拉问：这答案对寡妇说得通，因为寡妇眼下仍可嫁入祭司家；可是被休的妇人本已不可嫁入祭司家，又怎么说？她为何不立即行 脱鞋礼 呢？
The Gemara asks: This answer works out well with regard to a widow because as a widow she is currently still permitted to marry into the priesthood, but with regard to a divorcée, who is already prohibited from marrying into the priesthood, what is there to say; why shouldn’t she perform ḥalitza immediately?
革玛拉另给延后 脱鞋礼 的理由：缘故是，她若立即行 脱鞋礼，就失去从亡夫遗产所得的供养，而头三个月里她本来有权领取。
The Gemara provides an alternative reason to delay the ḥalitza: The reason is because by performing ḥalitza immediately she will forfeit the sustenance payments from her deceased husband’s estate, which she otherwise would have been entitled to for the first three months.
她在这三个月内既不准再嫁，便无以维生。
Since she is not permitted to remarry during those three months, she will have no means of support.
所以她应等过三个月，才行 脱鞋礼。
Therefore, she should wait until after three months have passed before performing ḥalitza.
问：这对已成婚、有权领供养的妇人说得通；只订了婚的被休妇人，既无供养可领，本又不可嫁祭司，何不立即行脱鞋礼？
革玛拉问：这答案对与前夫成过婚、因而有权领供养的妇人说得通；可是只与前夫订过婚的被休妇人，又怎么说？
The Gemara asks: This answer works out well with regard to a woman who was married to her previous husband and who is therefore entitled to sustenance payments, but with regard to a divorcée who was only betrothed to her previous husband, what is there to say?
她既无权领供养，也不可嫁入祭司家。
She is neither entitled to receive sustenance payments nor is she permitted to marry into the priesthood.
那么她为何不立即行 脱鞋礼 呢？
Why, then, shouldn’t she perform ḥalitza immediately?
革玛拉另给理由：照 拉比约西 的话。巴拉伊塔记一事：有人问他三个月内可否行脱鞋礼，他说不可；那人说就算她怀孕，也没犯什么禁令。
革玛拉于是另给延后 脱鞋礼 的理由：其实是照 拉比约西 所说的，如一则 《巴拉伊塔》 所教：曾有一事，某人来到 拉比约西 面前。
The Gemara therefore provides an alternative reason to delay the ḥalitza: Rather, it is due to that which Rabbi Yosei stated, as it is taught in a baraita: There was an incident involving a certain man who came before Rabbi Yosei.
那人对他说：丈夫死后三个月内行 脱鞋礼，哈拉哈 如何？
The man said to him: What is the halakha with regard to performing ḥalitza within three months of the husband’s death?
他对那人说：她不可行 脱鞋礼。
He said to him: She may not perform ḥalitza.
那人问他：就让她行 脱鞋礼 罢，那有什么不妥？
He asked him: Let her perform ḥalitza; what would be the problem with that?
她即便怀了孕，也没有触犯什么禁令。
Even if she is pregnant, no prohibition will have been transgressed.
拉比约西 引申命记答他：「那人若不愿意娶他哥嫂」才行脱鞋礼，可见唯有他愿意便能转房时才可行脱鞋礼；能转房的才能行脱鞋礼，不能转房的也不能，连暂时禁嫁的也包括在内。
为说明自己的判决，拉比约西 对他诵了这节经文：「那人若不愿意娶他的 叔娶之妇」（申命记25:7），要与他转房，就须行 脱鞋礼。
To explain his ruling, Rabbi Yosei recited this verse about him: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7) in levirate marriage, then he must perform ḥalitza.
原文 יְבִמְתּוֹ；和合本此句作「娶他兄长的妻」一类说法（原文「哥」字相叠），此处保留术语。
由此推知：唯有他若愿意便可与她成转房的情形，才有行 脱鞋礼 的余地。
By inference, the possibility of performing ḥalitza exists only in a case in which if he wishes he may consummate the levirate marriage.
这就教导了一条原则：凡可转房的，便可行 脱鞋礼；凡不可转房的，便不可行 脱鞋礼。
This teaches the principle that one who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for ḥalitza, and one who is ineligible for levirate marriage is ineligible for ḥalitza.
这连暂时不准嫁人的妇人也包括在内，例如前一段婚姻结束后头三个月内的妇人。
This includes even a woman who is temporarily prohibited from marrying, e.g., a woman in the first three months following a previous marriage.
拉夫希纳纳 引巴拉伊塔质疑：身份存疑的叔娶之妇行脱鞋礼而不转房，可见确有可行脱鞋礼却不可转房的情形。
拉夫希纳纳 引下面这则 《巴拉伊塔》 提出质疑：凡是否为 叔娶之妇 尚属存疑的妇人，行 脱鞋礼，却不转房。
Rav Ḥinnana raised an objection from the following baraita: Those women whose status as a yevama is uncertain perform ḥalitza but may not enter into levirate marriage.
照这则 《巴拉伊塔》，确有妇人可行 脱鞋礼 却不可转房的情形。
According to this baraita, there are in fact cases in which a woman is eligible for ḥalitza but may not enter into levirate marriage.
革玛拉追问：所谓身份存疑指什么？若指她与前夫的订婚存疑，何不让她转房？订婚无效，她便不是他兄弟之妻；订婚有效，她本就该与他转房。
革玛拉澄清案情：是否为 叔娶之妇 尚属存疑的妇人，指的是什么情形？
The Gemara clarifies the case: What is the case of women whose status as a yevama is uncertain?
若说指她与前夫的订婚是否成立尚属存疑，那她为何不转房？
If we say it is referring to a woman whose betrothal to her previous husband is uncertain, then why does she not enter into levirate marriage?
就让她转房好了，并无不妥：订婚若从未成立，她不是他兄弟之妻，本可嫁给这 亡夫兄弟；订婚若已成立，她如今就该与他转房。
Let her enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that, because if the betrothal was never valid, then she is permitted to the yavam as she is not his brother’s wife; and if it was valid, then she is now obligated to enter into levirate marriage with him.
所指的岂不是：有人与两姐妹中的一个订了婚，却不知是哪一个；他无后而死，亡夫兄弟不可与任一个转房，恐娶了那不曾订婚的、即系于他之妇的姐妹。巴拉伊塔说她行脱鞋礼，虽不可转房。
岂不是指这种存疑的情形：某人与两姐妹之一订了婚，却不知与哪一个订的婚？
Rather, is it not referring to a case of uncertainty in which a man betrothed one of two sisters and he does not know which one of them he betrothed?
那人若无后而死，亡夫兄弟 不可与两姐妹中任何一个完成转房，因为他也许会娶到那个不曾与他兄弟订婚的，而她是凭转房之系与他相连的妇人的姐妹，于他是禁婚的。
If that man then died childless, the yavam may not consummate the levirate marriage with either sister because it is possible that he will do so with the sister who was not betrothed to his brother, who is therefore forbidden to him as the sister of a woman who is bound to him by a levirate bond.
这正是那则 《巴拉伊塔》 所说的情形，而 《巴拉伊塔》 教导她行 脱鞋礼，虽然她不可转房。
This is in fact the case of the baraita, and the baraita teaches that she performs ḥalitza, even though she is not permitted to enter into levirate marriage.
革玛拉驳回此证：两案岂能相比？姐妹存疑之案，若以利亚来指明订婚的是哪一个，她便可行脱鞋礼、可转房；本质上可转房，只是不知而已。
革玛拉驳回这个证明：这两件事怎能相比？
The Gemara rejects the proof: How can these cases be compared?
在那里，即存疑的情形，若以利亚来说他订婚的是姐妹中的这一个，她便可行 脱鞋礼，也可转房。
There, in the case of uncertainty, if Elijah were to come and say that the man betrothed this one of the sisters, then she would be eligible for ḥalitza and levirate marriage.
可见那订了婚的姐妹本质上原可转房，阻碍她转房的只是无从知晓而已。
It is clear, then, that fundamentally the sister who was betrothed is actually eligible for levirate marriage, and it is merely a lack of knowledge that prevents her from entering into it.
可是三月之候的妇人，即使以利亚来说她没有怀孕，难道会听他、准亡夫兄弟与她转房？不会；连不能怀孕的未成年女孩也须等三个月。这条规定一概适用，故叔娶之妇本质上不可转房，也就不可行脱鞋礼。
可是在这里，前一段婚姻结束后三月之候的妇人，若以利亚来说这妇人没有怀孕，难道会听他，准许 亡夫兄弟 与她完成转房吗？
However, here, with regard to a woman during the first three months following her previous marriage, if Elijah were to come and say that this woman is not pregnant, would one pay heed to him and would we allow the yavam to consummate levirate marriage?
当然不会：未成年的女孩本不能怀孕，却也须等三个月，由此便可看出。
Certainly not, as is evident from the fact that a minor girl, who cannot become pregnant, must also wait three months.
可见等候三个月的规定一概适用，连那规定的理由不相干的情形也包括在内。
Evidently, the requirement to wait three months applies in all situations, even those in which the reason for the requirement is irrelevant.
因此，凭着那条规定，这 叔娶之妇 被视为本质上不可转房，同样也不可行 脱鞋礼。
Therefore, by virtue of that decree the yevama is considered to be fundamentally ineligible for levirate marriage and similarly is ineligible for ḥalitza.
巴拉伊塔：叔娶之妇在丈夫死后三个月内，由丈夫的遗产领供养，因她不得嫁人是前一段婚姻所致；此后便不领供养，既不由丈夫遗产，也不由尚未与她转房的亡夫兄弟。
革玛拉前面提到 叔娶之妇 由亡夫的遗产领供养。
§ The Gemara mentioned that a yevama is supported from her deceased husband’s estate.
现在引一则教导这条 哈拉哈 的 《巴拉伊塔》：贤哲们教导：叔娶之妇 在丈夫死后三月之候，由丈夫的遗产领供养。
It now proceeds to cite a baraita that teaches this halakha: The Sages taught: A yevama during the first three months following her husband’s death receives sustenance payments from the husband’s estate.
这是因为她如今不得嫁人，是她与他的前一段婚姻所致：正因那段婚姻，她须先等三个月才可再嫁。
This is because her previous marriage to him is the cause of her current unmarried state, since it is due to that marriage that she must first wait three months before remarrying.
此后她便不再领供养，既不由丈夫的遗产，也不由 亡夫兄弟，因为他还没有与她完成转房。
From this point forward, she does not receive sustenance payments, neither from the husband’s estate nor from the yavam, as he has not yet consummated a levirate marriage with her.
巴拉伊塔续说：亡夫兄弟被传上法庭、判定须转房或行脱鞋礼而逃走的，她便由他的产业领供养，作为对他的罚。
那则 《巴拉伊塔》 接着说：亡夫兄弟 若被传上法庭，判定他须与她完成转房或行 脱鞋礼，他却为躲避而逃走，她便由这 亡夫兄弟 的产业领供养，这是罚他玩忽本分。
The baraita continues: If the yavam was brought to judgment and it was decided that he was obligated to either consummate the levirate marriage with her or perform ḥalitza, and he ran away to avoid doing so, she receives sustenance payments from the estate of the yavam, which is his penalty for neglecting his duty.
问：她若落到一个未成年的亡夫兄弟面前待转房，又如何？由他那里自然领不到供养；由亡夫遗产呢？既是丈夫之死使她不得嫁人，他的遗产是否当供养她？
革玛拉问：她若落到一个未成年的 亡夫兄弟 面前待转房，哈拉哈 如何？
The Gemara asks: If she happened before her yavam who is a minor for levirate marriage, what is the halakha?
由这 亡夫兄弟 那里，她无权领任何供养，因为他未成年，不能完成转房；可是由她丈夫的遗产领供养，哈拉哈 如何？
From the yavam she does not have any right to sustenance payments because, as a minor, he is unable to consummate a levirate marriage, but as to payments from her husband’s estate, what is the halakha?
既然丈夫之死使她落到不得嫁人的境地，他的遗产是否须承担供养她的责任？
Since his death placed her in a situation that forces her to remain in an unmarried state, does his estate have to take the responsibility of supporting her?
拉夫阿哈 与 拉维纳 对此相争，一说她有权领供养，一说无权。裁定：她无权领供养，因这不归咎于丈夫，而是她受了上天的罚。
拉夫阿哈 与 拉维纳 对此相争：一位说她有权领供养，另一位说她无权。
Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter: One said she does have rights to sustenance payments, and the other one said she does not have any rights.
哈拉哈 是：她无权领供养。
And the halakha is that she does not have any rights to sustenance payments.
这是因为她的处境不归咎于丈夫；而是认为她受了上天的罚。
This is because the husband is not considered to be responsible for her situation; rather, it is thought that she was penalized by Heaven.
巴拉伊塔：亡夫兄弟们在丈夫死后三个月内与叔娶之妇行了脱鞋礼的，她仍须等满三个月才可再嫁。（下接叶四十二正）
贤哲们教导：亡夫的兄弟们在她丈夫死后三月之候与 叔娶之妇 行了 脱鞋礼 的，她仍须等满三个月才可再嫁。
§ The Sages taught: In the case of a yevama with whom the brothers of her deceased husband performed ḥalitza within three months of her husband’s death, she still needs to wait three months before remarrying.